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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVATE
ANTITRUST PLAINTIFF
EDWIN S. ROCKEFELLER*
Thirty years ago Fred Rodell said it so well: "For when the
Supreme Court sets out to tell Congress and the world what an act of
Congress really means, only the sky and such abstract principles as
can be drawn from the sky are the limit."' Rodell was complaining
at that time about the Court's hindering congressional efforts at
effective taxation. Rodell and his fellow legal realists have now had
their way on results in most areas of law, and there is not much left
for them to complain about so far as the Supreme Court is concerned.
And RodeII's "outrageous" statement in 1939 is now accepted as ob-
vious and unworthy of any particular notice.
In 1914, the Congress of the United States declared as a rule for
citizens to live by that the statute of limitations as to any private
rights created by the antitrust laws should be suspended whenever
"any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States"'
to enjoin or punish violations closely related to those complained of
by a private plaintiff. At the same time that this statute was passed,
Congress created a new federal agency, the Federal Trade Commis-
* A.B. 1948, LL.B. 1951, Yale University; Member, Connecticut and District of
Columbia Bars; Former assistant to the General Counsel, Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission; Partner, Wald, Harkrader & Rockefeller,
Washington, D.C.
1 Rodell, Woe Unto You, Lawyers! 51 (2d ed. 1957).
2 Clayton Act § 5, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964), amending 38 Stat.
731 (1914).
(a) A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any
civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under
the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall
be prima fade evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding
brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws or by the
United States under section 4A, as to all matters respecting which said judgment
or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That
this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before
any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered in actions
under section 4A.
(b) Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United
States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws,
but not including an action under section 4A, the running of the statute of
limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws
and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter:
Provided, however, That whenever the running of the statute of limitations in
respect of a cause of action arising under section 4 is suspended hereunder,
any action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred unless com-
menced either within the period of suspension or within four years after the
cause of action accrued. (Emphasis supplied.)
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sion,3 with antitrust responsibility parallel to that of the courts, and
handed to it great hopes for more flexible and more effective methods
of procedure than were possible in traditional courts of law. The idea
was that a bipartisan agency created by the Congress, independent to
some extent of the executive branch, would carry on for the Congress
a continuing surveillance of competitive methods in American business
and would, where necessary, declare unlawful for the future, methods
which the Commission concluded were unfair. The Commission's
method of procedure, specifically described in the statute, 4 was in-
tended to be something quite different from civil or criminal proceed-
ings instituted by the United States in the federal district courts.
In 1950 Congress strengthened the law against corporate acquisi-
tions which could adversely affect competition,' and, toward the end
of the Fifties, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice began to engage in some vigorous competition of their own
in the enforcement of the antimerger provision. Where the proceedings
were handled by the Department of Justice, potential private plain-
tiffs could anticipate two benefits from the proceedings. First, the
filing of the proceeding by the United States tolled the statute of
limitations. Second, a government victory could serve as prima facie
evidence against the defendant in subsequent treble-damage cases on
any matters as to which the Government's judgment would settle the
issue between the Government and the defendant.
The value to the private plaintiff of Federal Trade Commission
proceedings was not so clear. Highland Supply Corporation followed
up a Federal Trade Commission antimerger proceeding against Reyn-
olds Metals with a private action for damages. The District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri found that the two overt acts by
Reynolds Metals which could give rise to a private claim for damages
by Highland occurred more than four years before Highland filed its
complaint. The district court concluded that the action was barred by
the statute of limitations.' On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, Highland pointed to the FTC proceeding against
Reynolds and argued that the FTC proceeding tolled the statute of
limitations. The court of appeals could find "no ambiguity" in the
terms "civil or criminal proceeding" and concluded that an FTC
proceeding, as something entirely different, was not such a proceed-
ing.'
The Highland case never reached the Supreme Court, but the New
II Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U,S.C.
§§ 41-58 (1964).
4
 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
5 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
6
 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
7 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 1964).
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Jersey Wood Finishing case did.' A 1960 FTC complaint, also under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act,° alleged that a leading manufacturer of
electrical insulation tape, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Com-
pany (3M), had unlawfully acquired numerous electrical products
manufacturers and distributors. The Commission proceeding was
settled by a consent order of divestiture in 1961. 10 Within a year there-
after, New Jersey Wood Finishing Company, a competing electrical
insulation tape manufacturer which had previously distributed its
products through one of the acquired distributors, sued 3M for treble
damages, charging that the acquisition violated section 7 and was
part of a conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce in electrical
insulation products. The acquisition had taken place more than four
years before the private complaint was filed, but less than four years
before the Commission proceeding had been instituted. The parties
assumed that the suit was barred unless the FTC complaint tolled the
statute of limitations.
The district court denied a motion to dismiss, holding that the
statute had been tolled." On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed." When the case was brought up on certiorari, the Supreme
Court agreed with the lower courts," holding (1) that the statute of
limitations question is separate and distinct from the question of
whether an FTC order could be introduced in treble-damage suits as
prima facie evidence, (2) that FTC proceedings under the Clayton
Act toll the statute of limitations on private suits just as Justice De-
partment prosecutions do, and (3) that the statute is tolled by such
Clayton Act proceedings, even with respect to private claims under
the Sherman Act, when the challenged conduct in the private suit is
the same as in the Commission's Clayton Act proceeding.
The Supreme Court thereby decided that the mere fact that
Congress chose the words that it did in 1914 should not stand in the
way of what the Court calls "the one element of congressional inten-
tion which is plain on the record—the clearly expressed desire that
private parties be permitted the benefits of prior government ac-
tions."" The Court, in an opinion written by a former Assistant At-
torney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, found it necessary
to equate Federal Trade Commission proceedings with "government
8 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311
(1965).
9
 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
19
 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 59 F.T.C. 321 (1961).
11 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 216 F. Supp.
507 (D.N.J. 1963).
12 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346
(3d Cir. 1964).
13 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra note 8.
14 Id. at 320.
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actions" in order to avoid denying to private parties "the benefits
flowing from a major segment of the Government's enforcement ef-
fort."15
The case illustrates nicely the high regard which the Court holds
for private antitrust plaintiffs and the low regard which it holds for
the English language. The case is also worthy of notice for the em-
phatic dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Black, who has prob-
ably done as much as any man alive to destroy the plain meaning of
words in his interpretations of the Bill of Rights," documents at great
length what Senators and Congressmen in 1914 meant when they used
the words "civil or criminal proceeding."" It may be that this dissent
is responsible for two concessions in the Court's opinion. As the Court
put it, "It is true that the precise language of § 5(b) does not clearly
encompass Commission proceedings."" But the Court will go no
further than admitting that "there is little in the legislative history to
suggest that Congress consciously intended to include Commission
actions within the sweep of the tolling provision."" The Court uses
this as the starting point from which to state further that "neither
is there any substantial evidence that it consciously intended to ex-
clude them," and from there, the Court has placed itself in a position
to carry out the will of the Congress by refusing to deny to private
parties "the benefits flowing from a major segment of the Govern-
ment's enforcement effort!"20
Thus, on the surface, it appears that the legal realists have clearly
triumphed at the expense of Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Com-
pany and possibly to the benefit of New Jersey Wood Finishing
Company. The old-fashioned notion that ours is a government of laws
15 Ibid. It may be that Mr. Justice Clark, who wrote the opinion, and others on the
Court felt that by equating FTC proceedings with Department of Justice activities in
the courts they were lending greater dignity to the FTC or that by distinguishing between
the two types of proceedings that they would be denigrating those of the FTC. I happen
to think that the equation is denigrating to the FTC and that the Commission's reason
for existence and great potential usefulness depend on preserving the distinction which
the 3M case obscures. I have tried to say why in Antitrust Enforcement: Duopoly or
Monopoly, 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 437, and The Federal Trade Commission's Potential for
Making Purposeful Antitrust Policy, 24 Fed. B.J. 541 (1964).
16 For example, a local school board in New York provided that those pupils who
wished to do so might join in a brief prayer at the beginning of each school day,
acknowledging their dependence upon God and asking His blessing upon them and upon
their parents, their teachers, and their country. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Black, found this practice prohibited by the first amendment's "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424
(1962).
17 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra note 8,
at 324.
18
 Id. at 321.
19 Id. at 320.
20 Ibid.
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and not of men—laws at which any literate person can look, under-
stand, and thereby possibly guide his action—is looking more and
more old-fashioned. Surely, any literate person with the slightest
knowledge of the distinction between government antitrust actions in
United States district courts and Federal Trade Commission proceed-
ings in bearing rooms at the old Evening Star Building would have
thought that any "civil or criminal proceeding instituted by the
United States" could not possibly be referring to the latter. But armed
with a higher purpose, the Supreme Court of the United States has
read it to do so.
Rather than deciding the question now and thereby depriving
the business community, its lawyers and the lower courts of the
benefits of further litigation on the subject, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly declined 21 to state its view on how it would interpret the use
of the companion subsection as prima facie evidence of "a final judg-
ment or decree . . . in any civil or criminal proceeding brought by
or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws." One might
feel that if the Court failed to choke on the words "civil or criminal
proceeding," it need expect no more difficulty with the words "final
judgment or decree.'
The 3M decision raises or leaves unanswered several questions.
I. Is the statute of limitations tolled by an FTC complaint under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act when the complaint
alleges in substance a Sherman or Clayton Act violation?
II. Can a Commission order be relied upon by a treble-damage
plaintiff as prima facie evidence?
III. Can a court of appeals order affirming and enforcing a Com-
mission order be relied upon by a treble-damage plaintiff as prima
facie evidence?
I. THE TOLLING EFFECT OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION ACT
The 3M decision apparently applies to FTC proceedings under the
four substantive sections of the Clayton Act—section 2 on price dis-
crimination, section 3 on tying and exclusive arrangements, section 7
on mergers, and section 8 on interlocking directorates?' The Commis-
sion may, however, proceed as well against other types of antitrust
violations as unfair methods of competition, prohibited by Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 24
 The considerations relied
21 Id. at 318.
22 But see Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.
Mo. 1965).
23
 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13, 14, 18, 19 (1964).
24
 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
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upon by the Supreme Court in 3M are equally applicable to such
proceedings—the importance of private antitrust litigation as an en-
forcement weapon, the variety of ways in which prior prosecution of
a government suit will assist a treble-damage plaintiff charging the
same violations, and the illogic of making the enjoyment of these bene-
fits turn on "the arbitrary allocation of enforcement responsibility
between the [ Justice] Department and the Commission."'
The tolling provision of the Clayton Act applies to proceedings
"to prevent, restrain or punish violations of any of the antitrust
laws!`e Although Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is
not one of "the antitrust laws" as defined in the Clayton Act,27 it
could be argued that the proper test is the nature of the conduct at
which the proceeding is directed rather than the classification of the
statute under which the proceeding is brought. Thus, even if a Sherman
or Clayton Act violation is proceeded against under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, it may be no less a violation of the Sher-
man or Clayton Act, and the Commission proceeding no less "to prevent
[and] restrain" it. The 3M decision carries with it the suggestion that
challenged conduct, rather than the choice of statutes, determines
whether the limitations period is tolled, for the Commission's Clayton
Act proceeding was held to save the private plaintiff's Sherman Act
claim based upon the same acts even though plaintiff might be re-
quired to prove a greater anticompetitive effect than the Commission. 28
The Supreme Court's 3M opinion does not make entirely clear
the basis for the tolling effect of a Commission Clayton Act proceed-
ing. In its amicus brief to the Court, the Department of Justice implied
that the statute of limitations might be tolled not through application
of the Clayton Act tolling provision but through exercise of established
judicial power to toll statutory limitations when circumstances make
tolling appropriate. The opinion of the Court could be said generally
to adopt this approach, since it avoids, except in one instance, 29 any
specific statement that the statute of limitations was tolled by direct
operation of the Clayton Act tolling provision. The decision could
therefore support an argument that Federal Trade Commission Act
Section 5 proceedings toll the statute of limitations on Sherman or
Clayton Act claims.
Finally, whether or not the Clayton Act tolling provisions apply
25 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra note 8,
at 320.
26 Clayton Act § 5, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964), amending 38 Stat.
731 (1914).
27 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C.	 12 (1964).
28 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra note 8, at
322-24.
29 Id. at 322.
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directly to FTC Clayton Act proceedings, the Justice Department's
argument might nevertheless be made as an independent basis for an
analogous holding with respect to Federal Trade Commission Act
proceedings. 3M would thus outline the policy basis, but not the legal
theory, for a holding in favor of tolling.
II. FTC ORDERS AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court took great pains in 3M to separate the toll-
ing issue from the prima facie issue in its consideration of the rela-
tionship between FTC proceedings and subsequent treble-damage
suits.3° It pointed to textual differences between the tolling provisions
and the prima facie provisions of the Clayton Act; it recited the in-
dependent benefits conferred by the tolling provisions; and it recog-
nized the "delicate," 31 if not constitutional, problems inherent in the
prima facie issue not present with the tolling question. But the opinion
does not preclude a subsequent holding that FTC orders under the
Clayton Act cannot be used as prima facie evidence by treble-damage
plaintiffs even though a judicial decree against the same violation
could be so employed.
To the extent that 3M rests upon the judicial power to toll a
statute of limitations when basic policy so demands, and not upon the
specific command of the Clayton Act tolling provisions, a different re-
sult on the prima facie question could be defended. The Court could
conclude that despite its freedom to mitigate the rigours of a statute of
limitations, it has no such power over the use of judgments between
two parties in an action involving a third, and so it must keep within
the limits set by the prima facie provision of the Clayton Act.
This rationale—or any other which might be relied upon to
withhold prima facie effect from FTC orders—would have to be
sufficiently strong to overcome both the policy in favor of private anti-
trust litigation and the illogic in giving different effect to Commission
and court orders against the same conduct under the same statute.
These considerations are as applicable to a prima facie claim as to the
tolling claim upheld in 3M. Further, the prima facie question is essen-
tially a question of the quantum of evidence permitted to go to the
trier of fact or to support a verdict, matters traditionally governed
by judicially-evolved rules. And the question is closely related to the
judge-made doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel„ which
seem within the power of courts to expand or to contract except as
3° Unlike the court of appeals, which had concluded that the two issues should not be
separated. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note
12, at 360.
11
 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra note 8,
at 317.
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Congress may determine otherwise. Thus, unless a legislative intent
specifically to withhold prima facie effect from FTC orders can be
discerned, the Supreme Court could parallel its 3M holding with a de-
cision that Commission orders—at least orders under the Clayton Act
—may be used like judicial decrees to help prove a treble-damage
claim.
An approach to the prima facie question which does not rely on
the specific prima facie provision of the Clayton Act would probably
be easiest to apply to Commission orders entered under Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Unlike the tolling provision, the
prima facie provision of the Clayton Act speaks of orders in proceed-
ings "under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has vio-
lated said laws."" Since Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act is not an "antitrust law," section 5 proceedings could be held out-
side the scope of the Clayton Act prima facie clause on this account.
Nor is it clear, even if a Commission proceeding is a "civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States," that a Com-
mission order under the Federal Trade Commission Act can be "to the
effect that a defendant has violated said laws." The Commission has
no jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman Act as such, and a Commission
finding that the act has been violated is presumably without legal sig-
nificance. Even if the "to the effect" clause were interpreted to mean
Commission orders entered upon findings which make out a Sherman
Act as well as a Federal Trade Commission Act violation, a treble-dam-
age court would be required to determine whether the findings in a par-
ticular Commission case could be so characterized. This might prove
no easy task. And finally, the specific dependence of the Clayton Act
prima facie provision on estoppel doctrine may mean that a Federal
Trade Commission Act order can never be prima facie evidence under
that provision on the issue of a Sherman Act violation, since the issue
in controversy before the Commission was "whether . . . [an unfair
method of competition was employed], not whether ... the Sherman
Act had been violated. Consequently, there could be no estoppel."33
III. ORDER ON JUDICIAL REVIEW AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE
The argument might be made that, even if an FTC order cannot
be used as prima facie evidence, the order of a reviewing court affirm-
ing and enforcing a Commission order can be so used. Not all of the
objections which might be raised against the use of a Commission
order, however, such as the nature of Commission procedure and the
rules of evidence it applies, would thereby be overcome. The limitation
82 Clayton Act § 5, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964), amending 38 Stat.
731 (1914).
33 United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 352 (1958).
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on the scope of judicial review to whether there was substantial evi-
dence in the record as a whole to support the Commission's findings
would still permit an order of affirmance and enforcement to be entered
on the basis of less evidence than might be thought appropriate if the
order were to be used in a subsequent proceeding between the defend-
ant and a third party.
Reliance upon an order in review proceedings to apply the prima
facie provision of the Clayton Act would introduce a new factor into
the relationship between the courts and the Commission under the
judicial review provisions of the relevant statutes. If a Commission
order could not be used as prima facie evidence by a subsequent treble-
damage plaintiff in the absence of a favorable judicial order on review,
respondents in Commission proceedings might elect to forego their
right to review in order to protect themselves against potential damage
claims. The Commission would thus acquire significantly more freedom
from judicial scrutiny than it presently enjoys. Commission orders
would then be divided into two classes of effectiveness—those which
had been reviewed and those which had not—returning, in a sense, to
a distinction which the 1959 Finality Act" seemed aimed at abolishing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps there is little point in attempting to defend the plain
meaning of words where it is possible that the matter will be reviewed
by the Supreme Court. More to the point, perhaps, is to attempt to
deal with what might be the Court's thinking about the desirability
of particular results. It would be ironic if, out of a sense of delayed
respect for the importance of the Federal Trade Commission, the
Court were consistently to equate FTC proceedings with court pro-
ceedings. For then it would be not the legal realists, but the legal
traditionalists, who would have really won the final victory—victory
over the concept of the Federal Trade Commission as an administra-
tive agency, with delegated authority both to find the facts through
other than traditional methods and to declare rules for the future
where none existed before.
S4 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
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